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Abstract 
Decision theory has become widely accepted 
in the AI community as a useful framework 
for planning and decision making. Applying 
the framework typically requires elicitation 
of some form of probability and utility in­
formation. While much work in AI has fo­
cused on providing representations and tools 
for elicitation of probabilities, relatively little 
work has addressed the elicitation of utility 
models. This imbalance is not particularly 
justified considering that probability models 
are relatively stable across problem instances, 
while utility models may be different for each 
instance. Spending large amounts of time on 
elicitation can be undesirable for interactive 
systems used in low-stakes decision making 
and in time-critical decision making. In this 
paper we investigate the issues of reasoning 
with incomplete utility models. We identify 
patterns of problem instances where plans 
can be proved to be suboptimal if the (un­
know.n) utility function satisfies certain con­
ditions. We present an approach to planning 
and decision making that performs the utility 
elicitation incrementally and in a way that is 
informed by the domain model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Decision-theoretic problem solving requires a proba­
bilistic model of the world and of actions and a utilty 
model specifying the objectives to be achieved1. While 
the probability model is relatively stable across prob­
lem instances, the utility model for each problem in­
stance specifies the current objectives, and thus must 
be elicited anew. While much work has been done 
within the UAI community to address the problem of 
*This work was performed while the authors were on 
leave at the Dept. of Applied Statistics, National Institute 
of Development Administration, Bangkok, Thailand. 
1Note that these models need not be numeric. 
eliciting probabilities [14, 4], somewhat paradoxically 
little has been done to address the elicitation of util­
ity models. While this problem has been extensively 
studied in the field of Decision Analysis [8, 12], elic­
iting utility functions for interactive decision making 
systems raises new issues and offers new ways to facil­
itate elicitation, as we demonstrate in this paper. 
Elicitation of utility models can be a tedious and time­
consuming task. Most planning and decision making 
systems that make use of utilities nevertheless assume 
that all the utility information the system will receive 
is provided up front, thus all elicitation must be per­
formed before the system provides the user with any 
information concerning the problem solution. Indeed, 
most systems assume that a complete specification of 
the utility or value function is provided before any rea­
soning can proceed [13, 3] . This paradigm has the fol­
lowing drawbacks: 
• Often partial utility information will be sufficient 
to narrow down the set of alternatives to the point 
that the user is sufficiently indifferent among the 
remaining options to simply choose one or to the 
point that the user can easily pick out his most 
preferred option. For example, consider a vaca­
tion planning assistant that helps a user to find a 
suitable vacation package. To escape the icy Wis­
consin winter I may wish to go to some place warm 
and tropical with good diving. I may also wish to 
minimize my travel time and the cost of the trip. 
Clearly I would like to minimize the amount of 
time I need to spend specifying my preferences to 
the system. Fortunately, the above criteria are 
relatively easy to specify and can be used to elim­
inate a large number of undesirable options, with­
out requiring the user to specify tradeoff informa­
tion such as the tradeoff between travel time and 
quality of diving. Some tradeoff information may 
be necessary to sufficiently narrow down the set 
of options, but we maintain that this can be best 
identified by first filtering the options through the 
partial preference model. 
• In decision making situations where timeliness 
is of critical importance (for example, military 
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battlefield planning), we may not have sufficient 
time to completely elicit a utility function before 
presenting the user with some form of solution. 
While researchers have addressed the problem of 
time-critical decision making by designing flexible 
algorithms for reasoning under time constraints 
[7, 5], for many problems the elicitation of the 
model takes far more time than the actual infer­
ence. In such a situation we would like a flexi­
ble method for eliciting utility information that 
permits us to take advantage of whatever time is 
available and that elicits the most useful informa­
tion first. 
The ability to reason with partial utility models thus 
seems to be of no little importance for decision analysis 
and decision-theoretic planning systems. Recent work 
on qualitative represention of preferences [11, 1, 2) has 
addressed this issue by focusing on providing formal 
languages for representing partial preference models. 
In this paper we take a more modest approach to the 
representation of partial preference models in order 
to present a complete solution to elicitation and de­
cision making. We work within the standard frame­
work of multi-attribute utility theory and assume that 
the subutility functions for the relevant outcome at­
tributes are known. First we identify various problem 
characteristics that permit suboptimality of plans to 
be inferred based only on knowledge of the subutility 
functions. Then we examine how additional tradeoff 
information to further eliminate suboptimal plans can 
be elicited incrementally. 
The problem of eliminating suboptimal plans by using 
only knowledge of the subutility functions has been ad­
dressed by work on the DRIPS planner [6). Assuming a 
simple additive utility function, DRIPS iteratively cy­
cles through the process of refining abstract plans and 
eliminating classes of dominated plans until only the 
efficient frontier remains. The main drawback of this 
system, however, is that it does not allow the partial 
utility model to be augmented, and as such is inca­
pable of narrowing down the efficient frontier when 
the need for more specificity arises. The second aim 
of this paper is to address this problem. In particu­
lar, we present a lazy elicitation approach to planning 
and decision making that alternates between eliminat­
ing provably suboptimal plans and interactively ac­
quiring information about the utility model from the 
user. The process is terminated when the user indi­
cates that the current set of candidate plans is accept­
able. A novelty of this approach is that the decision 
of what piece of information about the utility model 
should be acquired is aided with the knowledge about 
the still-competing alternatives - the efficient frontier. 
More specifically, we propose applying the rank cor­
relation coefficient measure - a well-known concept in 
regression theory - to identify the piece of tradeoff in­
formation that would reveal to us the highest number 
of suboptimal plans. We present an intuitive justifi­
cation for the use of this measure and support it with 
empirical results. We have extended the DRIPS plan­
ner to incrementally acquire tradeoff information using 
this measure. We demonstrate its effectiveness on the 
medical decision problem of finding optimal strategies 
for management of deep venous thrombosis. 
2 PARTIAL UTILITY MODELS 
In this section we investigate the issues of reason­
ing with incomplete utility models. With a complete 
utility function, we can determine our preference be­
tween any two candidate plans by simply comput­
ing and comparing their expected utilities. The plan 
with lower expected utility is deemed dominated and 
is eliminated. We call this overall dominance. But 
when only a partial specification of the utility func­
tion is available, what we might be able to determine 
is some local dominances. For example, we may think 
that the plan of going to Siberia for winter vacation is 
dominated by the plan of going to the Caribbean with 
respect to individual objectives "warmth" and "dis­
tance". So the question now becomes: "what sorts of 
conditions must be satisfied in order for us to legiti­
mately infer overall dominance based on a set of local 
dominances?". 
In multi-attribute utility theory, "local dominance", or 
local preference, implicitly presupposes certain kinds 
of independencies. We continue with a quick review 
of fundamental concepts and terminology of multi­
attribute utility theory. For an extensive develope­
ment of this theory, the reader is refered to [8) 
2.1 MULTI-ATTRIBUTE UTILITY 
THEORY 
In the most abstract form, multi-attribute utility the­
ory is concerned with the evaluation of the conse­
quences or outcomes of an agent's decisions or acts, 
where outcomes are characterized with complex sets 
of features called attributes. The attributes are hence-
forth denoted by X1,X2, . .. , Xn, and outcomes are 
designated by x = (x1, . .. , xn), where x; designates 
the value of attribute X;. Abusing notation, we de­
note the set of values an attribute X; can take sim­
ply by X;, and thus the outcome space S1 is just the 
Carthesian product xl X x2 X . .. X Xn. We will 
often talk about subsets Y of the set of attributes 
X= {Xl,X2,···,Xn}, and also refer toY and their 
complements Z = X -Y as attributes. With respect 
to such a pair (Y, Z), an outcome x = (x1, x2, . . . , Xn) 
can be written as (y, z). For example, if n = 5 and 
Y = {X1,X3}, then y = (x1,x3) and z = (x2, x4,xs). 
When there is no uncertainty involved, in order to 
make decisions, an agent needs only express pref­
erences among outcomes. The preference relation, 
henceforth denoted by >-, can often be captured by 
an order-preserving, reai="valued value function v. 
Given a preference order �over n, an attribute Y c X 
is preferentially independent of its complement Z, or, 
for short, Y is PI, if the preference := over outcomes 
that are fixed in Z at some level does not depend on 
this level. 
To infer the overall preference from such local prefer­
ences also seems straightforward; what we need is the 
direction agreement of the local preferences. Formally, 
we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 If both Y and its complement Z are 
PI, and y':= y",z' := z", then (y',z') := (y",z"). 
When there is uncertainty, the outcomes of an agent's 
decisions or acts are characterized by probababilities. 
To differentiate between certain and uncertain out­
comes, we call uncertain outcomes prospects, and use 
outcomes to refer to outcomes with no uncertainty. 
Thus, prospects are probability distributions over pos­
sible outcomes, or outcome space n. Now the agent 
faces the more difficult task of ranking the prospects, 
instead of outcomes. The central result of utility the­
ory is a representation theorem that proves the exis­
tence of a utility function u : n --* R such that prefer­
ence order among prospects can be established based 
on the expectation of u over outcomes. The key point 
here is that the utility function is defined over out­
comes alone; the extension to prospects via expecta­
tion is a consequence of the axioms of probability and 
utility [10]. 
The generalization of preferential independence to the 
uncertainty case is the concept of utility independence 
(UI). Given a preference order := over the prospects 
over n, an attribute Y c X is utility independent of its 
complement Z, or, for short, Y is UI, if the preference 
>- over prospects that are fixed in Z at some level does 
not depend on this level. 
When applicable, utility independence gives us very 
useful hints about the form of the utility function. To­
wards this end, below we list a few relevant results, 
using [8] as our source. 
Proposition 2 (Basic Decomposition) If 
some attribute Y C X is UI, then the utility function 
u( x) must have the form: 
u(x) = u(y, z) = g(z) + h(z).u(y, z+), 2 
where g(·) and h(·) > 0 depends only on z but not on 
y, and z+ is some fixed value of z. 
From this result and the next few ones, we can see that 
utility independence plays just as fundamental a role 
in utibty theory as does probabilistic indepf:ndence in 
probability theory: it provides modularity and decom­
position. When the UI of an attribute Y holds, the as­
sessment of the utility function u(x) is reduced to the 
2The function u(y, z+), defined over variable y is called 
the subutility function for the attribute Y, and is sometimes 
designated by uy(y). 
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assessment of three functions all of which have fewer 
arguments. This reduction of dimensionality is cru­
cial, both analytically and practically. The following 
theorems further investigate the implications various 
sets of UI assertions have on the form of the utility 
function. 
Proposition 3 (Multi-Linear Form) If each at­
tribute X; is UI, then u( x) can be written in the fol­
lowing form: 
u(x) = L ky. IT u; (x;) , (1) 
0,tY�X XiEY 
where u;(x;) is the utility function u(x;,;r;+), defined 
at some fixed, convenient value X£'+ E X; = X- {x;}. 
The ky constants serve as scaling constants so that ali 
subutility functions u; are scaled from 0 to 1 wrt any 
2 values x? and xi so that xi is prefered to x?, and u 
is scaled from 0 to 1 wrt (x�, ... , x�) and (xi, ... , x�). 
In practice, it is often convenient to set x; and x? to 
the two extreme levels of X;. 
One problem of the multilinear utility function is that 
it requires the assesment of 0(211) scaling constants, 
in addition to the assesment of the subutility functions 
u;. Stronger independence assumptions must hold in 
order for simpler forms of utility functions to be valid. 
One of the most interesting cases is mutual utility in­
dependence (MUI), when not only each single attribute 
X; is UI, but every attribute 0 =f Y C X is UI. 
Proposition 4 (MUI Forms) If the attributes X; 
are M U I, then there are n+ 1 constants k, k1, k2, ... , k,. 
such that 1 + k = n�=l (1 + kk;), and ky 
kiYI-l f1x,EY k;. And, depending on the value ofk, the 
utility function takes one of the following two forms: 
• If k =/= 0, then 1 + ku(x) = f}7=1 (1 + kk; u;(x;)) , 
and the utility function is said to have multiplica­
tive form. 
• If k = 0, then u(x) = I:7::ol k;u;(x;), k; :=:: 0, 
:Z:7=l k; = 1, and the utility function is said to 
have additive form. 
2.2 REASONING WITH PARTIAL 
UTILITY MODELS 
We now focus our attention on the issue of how to in­
fer overall dominance from a set of local dominances. 
From now on we assume that each attribute X; is UI. 
In other words, the utility function is multilinear (see 
Equation 1). We assume that pl1 and pl2 are two can­
didate plans that result in the joint distributions over 
n with the corresponding density functions h and /2. 
Naturally, we would like to look for an analogous ver­
sion of Proposition 1 .  We begin with the following 
definition. 
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Definition 1 (Local Dominance) Plan pl1 is said 
to dominate plan pl2 with respect to attribute X;, de­
noted pl1 �; pl2, if 
l u;(x;)l1(x)dx 2: l u;(x;)h(x)dx. 
This means that if u;(x;) were the overall utility func­
tion, then pl1 would dominate pl2. This kind of local 
dominance can easily be established when the subutil­
ity functions u; are known but the scaling constants k 
are yet to be determined, a situation that often occurs 
in the process of assessing the overall utility function 
u. A natural step is to see if we can infer overall domi­
nance from a set of such local dominances, without the 
knowledge of the scaling constants. The next proposi­
tion answers this question in the affirmative, provided 
that the utility function has additive form. 
Proposition 5 Suppose that pl1 �i pl2, 'Vi= 1, . . .  , n. 
Furthermore, suppose that the utility function u has 
additive form. Then pl1 � pl2. 
Proof: For j = 1 ,  2 we have: 
E[u(plj)] l u(x)fj(x)dx 
l (t k;u;(x;))fJ (x)dx � k; (l ui(x;)fJ (x)dx) 
Thus pl1 � pl2 smce the coefficients k; are non­
negative. 0 
In the case when the utility function is only multi­
linear, an extra condition needs to hold in order to 
infer overall dominance. 
Proposition 6 Suppose that pl1 �i pl2, i = 1, . . . , n. 
Furthermore suppose that in the joint distributions f1 
and h, the random variables x; are probabilistically 
independent. Then pl1 � p/2. 
Proof: Note that the multi-linear function u in 
Equation 1 can be considered as the composi­
tion u h o w, where w n --+ Rn, 
w(x) = (ut(Xt), ... ,un(xn)), and h :  Rn --+ R, 
h(wt, w2, ... , wn) = Lll;tYcX ky ITx,EY w;. From 
the Basic Decomposition (Proposition 2), and the well­
known fact that utility functions are unique up to a 
positive linear transformation, it is not hard to see 
that h is a monotonically non-decreasing function with 
respect to each of its variables. 
With the introduction of this decomposition, the ex­
pected utility of plan plj, j = 1, 2 can be written as: 
E[u(plj )] 
2::: kyE1i[ IT u;(x;)] 
0,.:YcX X;EY 
(because x; are pro b. indep. wrt fJ )  
2::: ky IT E1i [u;(x;)] 
0;tYCX X,EY 
h(Ej1 [ul(xl)], ... , EjJun(xn)]). 
The overall dominance of pl1 over pl2 then follows di­
rectly from the given local dominances >-;, and the 
monotonicity of the n-dimension function -h. 0 
It is interesting to note the intrinsic relationship be­
tween Proposition 5 and 6. To see this, we first note 
that a necessary and sufficient condition for the utility 
function u to have additive form is that the prefer­
ence among prospects over n depends only on their 
marginal distributions [8]. We then note that for a 
joint distribution where the individual random vari­
ables are probabilistically independent, the joint dis­
tribution will be completely determined based on its 
marginals. The key difference between the two propo­
sitions is that we impose different restrictions in their 
premises. In the former proposition, the restriction is 
imposed on the form of the utility function (it must be 
additive), while in the latter, the restriction is imposed 
on the plans (they must result in distributions where 
probabilistic independence holds) . So in a sense, the 
two results are complementary. 
The above two propositions help us to infer overall 
dominance from local dominance. But they seem to 
require rather stringent conditions, either on the util­
ity function or the plans. If the utility function has 
multiplicative form, i.e. when we assume only MUI, 
unfortunately it is possible that pl1 dominates pl2 
with respect to each individual attribute, yet pl2 dom­
inates pl1 overall. Consider the following example. 
Let X= {Y,Z}, n = {(yt,Zt),(y2,Z2),(y3,Z3)}. The 
overall utility function u is the product of the subu­
tility functions, uy and uz: u(y, z) = uy(y)uz(z) 3. 
The utility functions and the two density functions f1 
and h are specified in the following table 4. 
y z Uy uz u ft h 
Yt Zt 1 0 0 1/2 1/4 
Y2 Z2 0 1 0 1[2 1/4 
Y3 Z3 1/3 1/3 1/9 0 1/2 
Clearly, 11 dominates h with respect to both Y and 
Z (EJ,[uy] = EJ,[uz] = 1/2 > EJ,[uy] = EJ,[uz] = 
5/12), but overall h dominates 11 (Eft [u) = 0 < 
Eh [u] = 1/18). It is interesting to ask if there is a con­
dition that would ensure the inference, yet is weaker 
than probabilistic independence. 
3This can be derived from the multiplicative form, 
whenever k is positive. 
4We also have a counter example for the case when the 
functions are continuous. 
To summarize so far, we have proved that overall dom­
inance can be infered from local dominances if the util­
ity function has additive form, or the rand?l_ll �ariab_
Ies 
corresponding to the attributes are probabihstically Ill­
dependent. 
3 PROBLEM-FOCUSED 
INCREMENTAL UTILITY 
ASSESMENT 
In this section we address the issue of acquiring more 
information about the utility model in order to narrow 
down the efficient frontier. We focus our attention on 
the case when the utility function has additive form: 
u(x) � 2.:::7=1 k;u;(x;), k; 2: 0, 2:7=1 k; � 1. We also 
assume that the subutility functions u; are already as­
sessed. 
Recall that for a plan pl that results in a prospect 
that is a probability distribution with density function 
f, its expected utility can be written as: E[u(pl)l == 
2.:::7=1 k;w;, where w; == fn u;(x;)f(x)dx. We set k == 
(k1,k2, ... ,k,...) and w = (wt,W2, .. . ,w,...), and thus 
E[u(pl )] == k o v, i.e., the inner product of two vectors 
k and w. 
Let us now assume that we have to choose the optimal 
plan(s) from a set P L == {p/1, p/2, ... , plm}, whe�e each 
plan plj has the expected uti!ity E[u(plj )] = � o t/i.i. 
Using Proposition 5, we can mfer overall dommance 
from local dominances, i.e., if pl;, plj E P L such that 
w; dominates wj with respect to each c�mponent, then 
we can conclude that overall, pl; dommates plj. We 
can also view this decision making problem as one with 
certainty. The objective is characterized with n at­
tributes W1, W2, ... , Wn, where a plan pl results in 
the (certain) outcome w, and there is an additive value 
function v( w) = k 0 w 5. 
3.1 THE RANK CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT 
W hen the efficient frontier identified by the above 
method is still too large, there is clearly a need to ac­
quire more information about the utility function u (in 
this case, information about the scaling constants k;) 
in order to eliminate more plans. In practice, there are 
two types of questions that we use to ask the decision 
maker. 
• Question Type I. For what probability p are 
you indifferent between: 
1. the prospect that hasp chance at x• and 1-p 
chance at x0 and 
2. the outcome (x�,X7). 
5Using Proposition 1, we have another proof for Propo­
sition 5. 
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• Question Type II. Suppose that x: E X;. For 
what value xj E Xj are you indifferent between 
two outcomes that yield x:, xJ, and x?, x; respec­
tively, and that agree on all other attnbutes at 
some level 6. 
It can be shown that the answer to Question I will be 
equal to k;, and since it can be shown that k; U; (xi) = 
k ·u ·(x'-) the answer to Question II would reveal the J J J ' 
ratio k;/kj (:::::. u1(xj)/u;(xi)). 
For our purpose, which is to identify more suboptimal 
plans, the value of a single scaling constant k; does not 
seem to be of much help. However, with the knowl­
edge of the tradeoff ratio k; / kj for some two attributes 
X; and Xj, the expected utility of a plan pl can be 
rewritten as: 
where k' is obtained from k by deleting the ith com­
ponent, and w' is obtained from w by deleting the 
ith component and changing the jth component to 
�w; + Wj. Note that the modified vectors will now 
h�ve (n- 1) components. We call this step the merg­
ing of two attributes X; and Xj. The problem now re­
duces to a decision making problem with certainty, and 
n - 1 attributes. The value function for this problem 
has additive form, with unknown scaling constants. In 
other words, we are dealing with exactly the same type 
of problem, with one less dimension. The process of 
identifying the new efficient frontier can now be re­
sumed. The process of alternatively finding the effi­
cient frontier and attribute-merging can be repeated 
until the user feels that the set of candidate plans is 
small enough, or until all of the scaling constants {and 
thus the overall utility function) are completely speci­
fied. 
Another, perhaps more illustrative way to look at this 
problem is the following. We view each plan as a com­
petitor in some competition and each attribute as a 
member of the jury. Initially, there are m competi­
tors and n jurors. The expected utility value Vji that 
the plan pl1 gets for the attribute X; will now be in­
terpreted as the mark competitor number j gets from 
juror number i. The marks of the jurors, however, are 
not of equal importance but instead are weighted by 
unknown weights k;. The attribute-merging step re­
quires the acquisition of information, specifically the 
ratio of some two weights k;, kj. We can view this 
step as the unification of the corresponding two jurors, 
number i and j to a group with the responsibility of 
giving a single mark to each competitor. If our goal is 
6Note that Question Type II is not applicable in the 
case when the two attributes x; and x, are discrete-valued. 
ff such situation occurs, we need to use Question Type I 
to assess the coefficients for the two attributes and then 
compute their ratio. 
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to find a unification that reveals a high number of non­
contender competitors, then obviously, we would like 
to avoid choosing a pair of jurors whose rankings for 
competitors - according to their marks- highly agree. 
So what we need here is a measure of the degree to 
which two rankings (dis)agree. Intuitively, one pos­
sible measure is the number of pairs of competitors 
who get "reverse" rankings from the two jurors. For 
example, if the first juror ranks four plans in order 
(1, 2, 3, 4), and the second juror ranks the same four 
plans in order (1,3,4, 2), then there are two "reverse" 
pairs, (3, 2) and (4, 2). The more "reverse" pairs there 
are, the more the two jurors disagree. In regression 
theory, the rank correlation coefficient (RCC), defined 
below, is an easily computed measure of this 7. 
Definition 2 (Rank Correlation Coefficient) 
Suppose that a (a1,a2, ... ,a,.) and b 
(b1,b2, ... ,b,.) are two permutations of {1,2, ... ,n}. 
Then the rank correlation coefficient of a and b, de­
noted by p( a, b) is defined as: 
It is not hard to see that -1 � p(a, b) � 1. In fact, 
the more "similar" the two rankings a and b are (the 
smaller the sum l:(a; - b;)2 is), the greater the rank 
correlation coefficient is. W hen there is no disagree­
ment, i.e. when a; = b;, Vi, the coefficient attains the 
highest possible value, 1. The coefficient attains the 
lowest possible value, -1, when a;+ b; = n + 1, 'r/i, i.e. 
when the two rankings are reverse of one another. 
Example. Consider the following three rankings: 
a= (1,2,3,4), b = (1,3,4,2), and c =  (4,2,1,3). We 
have that p(a, b) = 0.4 > p(a, c) = -0.4. It means 
that the agreement between a and b is higher than the 
agreement between a and c. This is no suprise be­
cause with respect to a, b contains two reverse pairs 
((3,2) and (4,2)), while c contains four reverse pairs 
((4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (2, 1)) 
Thus, by computing the RCC of every possible pair 
of attributes, we can identify the two attributes that 
when merged would likely reveal the most subopti­
mal plans. The process of alternatively asking for the 
tradeoff ratio of two attributes that have the smallest 
RCC, and identifying & eliminating suboptimal plans 
is repeated until the user is satisfied with the current 
set of candidates. 
It is important to note that the use of RCC does not 
guarantee that we will be able to identify the most 
suboptimal plans; it is only a heuristic. Although the 
merging of two highly conflicting attributes will resolve 
their conflict, the unpredictability of the tradeoff ratio 
(k;/kj, which in principle can be any positive num­
ber) makes it possible that a different pairing would 
7It can be shown that the more reverse pairs there are, 
the smaller the rank correlation coefficient is. 
eliminate more plans. For example, one attribute may 
conflict highly with all other attributes but the single 
attribute that conflicts most with it may have a very 
small coefficient so that the ranking of the merged at­
tribute is still very close to that of the first. However, 
we are encouraged by the experimental results of using 
RCC, reported in the next subsection. 
A point worth mentioning is that there are situations 
where the decision maker may feel more comfortable 
or confident in estimating the tradeoff ratios among 
certain types of attributes. For example, he may be 
comfortable in tradeoffs that involves monetary values 
such as costs while reluctant and uncertain in trade­
offs that involves less straightforward or sensitive at­
tributes such as morbidity or mortality. In such cases, 
the RCC method serves as a hint instead of as a nor­
mative must. 
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In our first experiment, we compare the performance 
of the algorithm that uses RCC with the random algo­
rithm (RAND), which randomly picks two attributes 
to merge. The performance of the algorithms is mea­
sured by the number of plans they are able to elimi­
nate after merging the first pair of attributes. We take 
the performance of the omniscient algorithm (OPT), 
which knows exactly the best two attributes to merge, 
as the baseline. 
Each experiment instance is generated by first choos­
ing n, the number of attributes and m, the size of the 
initial efficient frontier. We examine the cases when 
n takes values from 4 to 8 and m takes values from 
{25, 50, 100, 200} since these are ranges of values we 
expect to see in real-world problems. For each such 
pair of ( m, n) we randomly generate - using a uniform 
distribution on the interval [0, 1]- n coefficients ki and 
m x n expected subutilities for the m plans according 
to each of the n attributes. 
One standard way to evaluate the performance of two 
algorithms is to compute their competitive ratios8. We 
ran 500 trials and computed the average ratios of the 
number of suboptimal plans RCC and RAND identi­
fied versus the number OPT identified: p(RCC) = .89 
and p(RAN D) = .65. Other informative statistics 
are the percentage of times when RCC outperforms 
RAND: 85%, the percentage of times RCC identifies 
as many suboptimal plans as OPT does: 37%, and the 
percentage of times RCC does better than average: 
92%. Here average is defined as the average number of 
plans eliminated over all possible choices of attribute 
pairings. 
8Competitive ratio is the fundamental concept in the 
competitive analysis of on-line algorithms. This ratio mea­
sures the performance of an on-line algorithm using that 
of the optimal off-line algorithm as the straw man. In 
this context, OPT plays the role of the optimal off-line 
algorithm. 
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Figure 1: Anytime performance of RCC and RAND. 
In our second experiment, we compare the perfor­
mances of RCC and RAND when the process of elimi­
nating suboptimal plans and merging attributes is re­
peated until all of the attributes are merged into a 
single comprehensive attribute. Figure 1 records the 
results in the case when m = 50 and n = 6. The 
two graphs indicate the average sizes - also with 500 
problem instances - of the current efficient frontier af­
ter 0,1,2,3,4, and 5 attribute-mergings are done. The 
fact that the graph of RCC lies below the graph of 
RAND indicates that RCC on average has better any­
time performance than RAND: using a same number 
of questions, RCC is on average able to identify more 
suboptimal plans than RAND. This is also true for any 
other case of { m, n} pairs. 
We have enhanced the DRIPS planning system, incor­
porating the ability to incrementally add tradeoff ra­
tios of attributes during the process of eliminating sub­
optimal plans, using RCC as its guiding heuristic. We 
applied this new version of DRIPS to the problem of 
identifying the optimal management strategy for deep 
venous thrombosis [6]. Strategies for this problem are 
evaluated with respect to four attributes: mortality 
(DEATH), progression to pulonary embolism (PE), in­
cidence of a bleeding episode (BLEED), and monetary 
cost of test and treatment (COST). PE and BLEED 
can be considered morbidity factors. The first three 
attributes are binary attributes, while COST has a 
range from 0 to 50,000. 
The overall utility function for the strategies is as­
sumed to have additive form, with the subutility func­
tions for the attributes: u(attr) = 1 - attr for the 
binary attributes and u(COST) = 1- COST/50, 000. 
Out of 1022 initial plans, the system identifies the ini­
tial efficient frontier containing 91 candidate plans. 
The system then identifies BLEED and PE as the 
most conflicting pair of attributes. Since these two at­
tributes are discrete, we need to assess the coefficients 
for each of the two attributes using Questio Type I. 
The coefficient for attribute BLEED, for example, can 
be assessed by asking the decision maker the following 
question: 
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"For what probability p are you indiffer­
ent between a lottery that yields either 
the outcome \DEATH = O,BLEED = 
0, P E = 0, COST = 0) with probability 
p and outcome (DEATH = 1, BLEED = 
1,PE = l,COST = 50 , 000) with prob­
ability 1 - p, and the certain outcome 
{DEATH !,BLEED O,PE = 
1, COST= 50, 000)?" 
The answer for this question will be the coefficient of 
the attribute BLEED. 
After getting the coefficients for BLEED ( .01) and PE 
( .02), we can compute the tradeoff ratio between these 
two attributes (1/2). Using this ratio, the system is 
able to eliminate 66 more plans, and thus reduces the 
set of candidates to 25 plans. After getting the second 
tradeoff ratio of attributes BLEED/PE and DEATH, 
the system narrows down the set of candidates to 4 
plans 9. This experiment demonstrates the ability of 
the DRIPS system to quickly identify a set of candidate 
plans with a very small size without obtaining the com­
plete utility function (namely, without obtaining the 
tradeoff information that involves attribute COST). 
4 SUMMARY AND RELATED 
WORK 
In this paper we have explored possible ways to in­
fer overall dominance from a set of local dominances 
using only partial utility models. We introduce the 
concept of lazy, problem-focused utility elicitation and 
show how this concept is used in elicitation for decision 
making problems where the utility function has addi­
tive form. We propose using the rank correlation coef­
ficient to identify the piece of information that would 
most likely reveal a large number of suboptimal can­
didates. We demonstrate its effectiveness with exper­
imental results. 
It is interesting to note that in decision making prob­
lems under certainty where the value function has ad­
ditive form, the RCC method is particularly useful. In 
order to identify the efficient frontier and determine 
the rank correlation coefficient, we need not know the 
exact forms of the subvalue functions; all we need is the 
directionalities of the subpreferences. The subvalue 
functions need to be assessed only when we ask the 
decision maker for the tradeoff ratio between the two 
chosen attributes. As a consequence, it is quite pos­
sible that the interactive planning process can be ter­
minated without assessing all the subvalue functions -
a clear savings in effort. 
Additive utility functions have enormous computa­
tional advantages over other less structured utility 
functions such as multilinear or multiplicative utility 
9ln this case, since we have enough data to determine 
all of the coefficients, we have the complete utility function 
and thus are able to identify the optimal plan(s). 
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functions. However ,  the condition for the existence 
of an additive utility function , additive independence, 
is rather strict .  A possible bridge between additive 
utility functions and the rest is the concept of condi­
tional additive independence (CAI) , as introduced in 
[8] , and recently further explored in [1) .  Conditional 
additive independence is weaker than additive inde­
pendence, but still provides additive decompositions 
for utility functions ,  albeit in a slightly different form. 
A straightforward extension of this work would be to 
investigate the extension of the RCC method to the 
case of CAL 
Linden, et .al .  [9] present a general methodology and a 
particular implementation of interactive problem solv­
ing very much in the spirit of the present work. Their 
candidate/critique model works by presenting a set of 
candidate solutions to the user and then incrementally 
eliciting user preferences in the form of critiques of 
these solutions. They assume an additive utility func­
tion and start with some user preferences augmented 
with a set of default preferences. In addition to dis­
playing the option that is optimal with respect to these 
preferences, they use two heuristics to select other in­
teresting options. The first is to display options that 
are significantly different from one another with re­
spect to the utility function . The second is to display 
extreme solutions that optimize at least one attribute. 
For example, in their domain of flight scheduling they 
always display the cheapest flight . Use of these heuris­
tics provides the user with a set of candidate solutions 
that provide a fair coverage of the space of possible so­
lutions. The user provides critiques of the solutions by 
directly modifying the represented preferences using a 
graphical interface . 
The idea of presenting the user with extreme solutions 
could be nicely incorporated into our present work .  
In particular, it may be that the ranges of some at­
tributes are so small that they can be ignored for all 
practical purposes. For example, if we are considering 
airline flights and the range of cost for the available 
options is only $500 - $5 10 ,  then cost should not be a 
factor. By displaying the possible ranges of outcome 
attributes, we can permit the user to identify those for 
which there is no significant difference among solutions 
and can set it's weight to zero. The same effect could 
be accomplished by eliciting tradeoff information, but 
setting the weight to zero involves a simpler decision 
on the part of the user. 
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